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ABSTRACT
Recent research revealed a considerable lack of reliability for user
feedback when interacting with adaptive systems, oen denoted as
user noise or human uncertainty. Moreover, this lack of reliability
holds striking impacts for the assessment of adaptive systems and
personalisation approaches. Whenever research on this topic is
done, there is a very strong system-centric view in which user
variation is something undesirable and should be modelled with the
eye to eliminate. However, the possibilities of extracting additional
information were only insuciently considered so far.
In this contribution we consider the neuroscientic theory of
the Bayesian brain in order to develop novel user models with the
power of turning the variability of user behaviour into additional
information for improving recommendation and personalisation.
To this end, we rst introduce an adaptive model in which pop-
ulations of neurons provide an estimation for a feedback to be
submied. Subsequently, we present various decoder functions
with which neuronal activity can be translated into quantitative
decisions. e interplay of cognition model and decoder functions
lead to dierent model-based properties of decision-making. is
will help to associate users to dierent clusters on the basis of their
individual neural characteristics and thinking paerns. By means
of user experiments and simulations, we show that this information
can be used to improve the standard collaborative ltering.
KEYWORDS
User Noise, Human Uncertainty, Collaborative Filtering, User Models, Bayesian
Brain, Probabilistic Population Codes, Cognitive Agency, Neural Coding
ACM Reference format:
Kevin Jasberg and Sergej Sizov. 2018. Neuroscientic User Models:
e Source of Uncertain User Feedback and Potentials for Improving Rec-
ommendation and Personalisation. In Proceedings of arXive, hps://arxiv.org,
April 2018, 9 pages.
DOI:
1 INTRODUCTION
Personalisation and recommendation have become indispensable
in most systems nowadays and the trend still continues to grow
in that direction. During the last decade, the growth of interac-
tions continuously supported innovations in a data-driven fashion.
is is advantageous as we need to understand a user along with
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Figure 1: Visualisation of uncertain user responses for a re-
peated feedback task.
his preferences, peculiarities and behaviour to adapt recommen-
dation and personalisation in order to provide an appealing user
experience. is is done by inventive user models and by injecting
information into modern personalisation engines based on tech-
niques of machine learning, but the bedrock of such eorts is a
thorough knowledge about the user, either by observation (implicit
knowledge) or by questioning (explicit knowledge).
e strong dependence on user-generated data is curse and bless-
ing at the same time, because the fundamental problem with user
feedback is its uncertainty. is means that a considerable fraction
of users behave dierently in the same context or decide otherwise
if a decision task has to be repeated. is phenomenon is oen
denoted as user noise (or human uncertainty in recent research) and
gives user data the nature of a random variable. As an introductory
example we consider the repeated rating of lm trailers in a short
temporal interval (granting same emotional and cognitive context)
with a sucient number of distractors between rating repetitions.
Figure 1 shows the dierent ratings of four users of this experiment,
which will be described in more detail in forthcoming sections. It
becomes clear that this user feedback is scaering around a central
tendency and hence supports the assumption of a random variable.
is feature has recently been in the focus of some research that
presented both, induced problems in the evaluation of adaptive
systems as well as aempts for possible solution strategies.
e commonality of all these contributions in the eld of user
modelling, adaptation and personalisation is that there is a very
strong system-centric view in which user variation is something
undesirable and should be modelled with the eye to eliminate. All
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developed solutions more or less simply try to ignore uncertain data
(which obviously leads to results with less uncertainty as well) but
they are by no means satisfactory and thus we have to ask whether
this controversial view amidst a large fraction of researches is yet
worthwhile. In this contribution, we want to introduce a new and
diametrically opposed paradigm in which we consider uncertainty
no more as a mistake or dysfunction with destructive side eects,
but rather as an opportunity for gathering additional information.
Such an undertaking sensibly has to start with the measurement of
user feedback along with its uncertainty and by transmission of this
data to a user model, which maps uncertainty into an information
space in order to successively supplement a user prole. Since the
measurement of user noise or human uncertainty has already been
a subject of research, we conne ourselves to the development of a
novel user model with special sensitivity for response uncertainty.
is naturally leads to the following research questions:
(1) What does a possible model look like that considers human
decision variability and maps it into the highest possible
concentration of additional information?
(2) How can this information be integrated into existing rec-
ommender systems and personalisation engines?
(3) What are the nal benets of this particular user model and
what are the benets of this novel paradigm in general?
2 RELATEDWORK
Recommender Systems and Assessment. A lot of research
about recommendation and personalisation produced a variety
of techniques and approaches [14, 25]. For the comparative as-
sessment, dierent metrics are used to determine the prediction
accuracy, such as the root mean squared error (RMSE), the mean
absolute error (MAE), along with many others [4, 12]. In our con-
tribution, we internalise existing criticism about a lack of under-
standing human beings in the process of system design [20, 23] and
develop a user model that is close to the current way of looking at
the functionality of the human brain.
Dealing with Uncertainties. e relevance of our contribu-
tion arises from the fact that the unavoidable human uncertainty
sometimes has a vast inuence on the evaluation of dierent predic-
tion algorithms [1, 28]. e idea of uncertainty is not only related
to recommender systems but also to measuring sciences such as
metrology. Recently, a paradigm shi was initiated on the basis of a
so far incomplete theory of error [5, 11]. In consequence, measured
properties are currently modelled by probability density functions
and quantities calculated therefrom are then assigned a distribution
by means of a convolution of their argument densities. is model
is described in [18]. We transfer this perspective to user feedback
by considering it as a single draw from an underlying distribution.
is provides us with a probabilistic reference which we can use to
verify the predictions based on our own user model.
e Idea of Human Uncertainty. e idea of underlying dis-
tributions for user feedback is not far-fetched since the complexity
of human perception and cognition can successfully be addressed
by means of latent distributions [6]. We adopt the idea of modelling
user uncertainty by means of individual Gaussians for constructing
our individual response models and thus follow the argumentation
in latest research of neuroscience and metrology [19, 24]. Proba-
bilistic modelling of cognition processes is also quite common to
the eld of computational neuroscience. In particular, aspects of
human decision-making can be stated as problems of probabilistic
inference [9] (oen referred to as the “Bayesian Brain” paradigm).
At any time when a decision has to be made, one has to consider a
variety of yet unknown states of the world which are most relevant
for the decision process itself. According to [10], each of these states
are unconsciously estimated by a population of neurons (agency)
and thus being made accessible to the brain. In doing so, there is
evidence that each agent provides a probability density over pos-
sible values of such a state of the world (probabilistic populaton
codes) and thus also accounts for its uncertainty [24]. However,
these estimations slightly dier in each cognition trial due to the
volatile concentration of released neurotransmiers, impacting the
spiking habits of downstream neurons (neural noise) [8, 24]. In
other words, human decisions can be seen as uncertain quantities
by nature of the underlying cognition mechanisms. In this paper,
we adopt the theory of noisy probabilistic population codes (nPPCs)
and use them to construct a user model that can naturally represent
and explain response uncertainty with neural noise, mapping this
uncertainty to specic neural parameters.
HumanUncertainty in Computer Science. User noise or hu-
man uncertainty has been mentioned before in computer science.
e rst reference in the context of user feedback came along with
a study on the applicability of thinking strategies to product recom-
mendations, where reliability problems were registered for repeated
ratings [13]. e authors, like [12] later on, have already specu-
lated on its impact on adaptive systems’ accuracy. is assumption
was later conrmed when uncertainty in user ratings (measured
by re-rating) and its impact on the RMSE was demonstrated [1, 2].
However, this impact was a mere deterioration by means of a spe-
cic metric. A more sophisticated analysis is provided by [26],
where it could be demonstrated that human uncertainty leads to an
oset in a specic metric (magic barrier). is approach was later
expanded by [16] and it was shown that this barrier has some uncer-
tainty itself, i.e. even if RMSE scores are not below this barrier, they
could already be completely random. Additional contributions also
revealed that each accuracy metric considering human feedback is
naturally biased and that possible rankings built upon these metric
scores are subject to probabilities of error [17].
To solve this problem, some strategies have been proposed over
the years, just like a pre-processing step that deletes highly deviant
values and replaces them by articial values closer to the mean
of a re-rating [2]. Another approach is to provide model-based
predictions with uncertainty as well, so that the uncertainties of a
rating and a predictor eliminate each other when calculating their
dierence [21]. Yet another possibility is to compute metrics only
with deviations that dier widely from a given predictor and hence
can not be explained by human uncertainty [15]. With our contri-
bution, we want to move away from the paradigm of extinction
and present a way in which uncertainty can be sensibly used to
generate benets.
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3 THEORY, MODELS AND APPLICATIONS
e Single Neuron Model
e response of a single neuron to a stimulus is limited to trans-
mission of electric impulses (spiking) and since each neuron has
only got two states of activation, theories of neural coding assume
that information is encoded by the spiking frequency (rate) [7]. e
functional relationship between responses r of a neuron and the
characteristics s ∈ S ⊂ R of a stimulus is given by the so-called
tuning curve r = f (s). Besides irregular shapes, tuning curves have
frequently been measured to be bell-shaped or sigmoid-shaped
respectively. Each tuning curve maximises for a particular value
p := argmax f , denoted as the preferred stimulus. For bell-shaped
tuning curves, f : S → R can be modelled as
fp (s) := д · h(p,w)(s) + o, (1)
where the shape emerges from the Gaussian density functionh with
mean p and standard deviation w ∈ R>0 (tuning curve width). e
additional components д ∈ R>0 and o ∈ R>0 represent a frequency
gain and oset respectively.
When measuring tuning curves in reality, one will nd that they
are somewhat noisy and that even one and the same stimulus never
leads to the same response. is uctuations can be explained by
the so-called neural noise [8]. Neuronal responses must therefore
be seen as random variables R rather than xed values determined
by tuning curves. It has been found that R∼Poi(λ) follows a Poisson
distribution with expectation λ = f (s) [24, 27].
Probabilistic Population Codes
We now consider a population of n neurons, all with the same
tuning curve type with (almost) the same neural parameters. e
only dierence is in the preferred values pj , which are equidistantly
spread across the range of possible stimuli (estimation scale). Math-
ematically we realise this by considering the real continuous set
S ⊂ R and a sequence (pj )j=1, ...,n being an equidistant discretisa-
tion of S . All parameters determining the population size n, the
shape of all tuning curves as well as the assumed stimulus s ∈ S
are summarised in a vector ξ = (n,д,w,o, s) which we will refer to
as the cognition vector in the following. Given a particular xed
s (which is formed from unknown underlying cognitions), each
neuron of this population will respond according to its specic
tuning curve and interference due to neural noise. erefore, a
response r j of the j-th neuron must be seen as a realisation of the
random variable Rj ∼ Poi(fpj (s)). In order to keep in mind, that
these responses are always dependent on the parameters of the
cognition vector, we henceforth use the notation r j (ξ ) as realisa-
tion of Rj (ξ ). e response of the entire population is formed by
the response of each neuron and so we denote the n-dimensional
random variable
R(ξ ) := (R1(ξ ) , . . . , Rn (ξ )) (2)
as the population response for a given ξ with realisation ϱ(ξ ) =
(r1(ξ ) , . . . , rn (ξ )). is theory of the origin of noisy population
responses is illustrated in Fig. 2. In this example, we used ξ =
(11, 10, 0.5, 5, 3) as the cognition vector , i.e. we consider n = 11
neurons that respond to the assumed stimulus (in this case: cogni-
tion result) of s = 3 stars where each tuning curve has the oset
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Figure 2: Genesis of noisy population responses demonstrat-
ing the alteration for each cognition trial (red and blue).
o = 5 Hz, the width w = 1 Hz and the gain д = 7. In the le pic-
ture we can see the individual tuning curves, which are distributed
equidistantly over the possible range of a rating scale with ve
stars. For s = 3 stars, the responses of each neuron can be fetched
from its tuning curve. For a beer representation of the population
response, it has become a standard to plot the individual responses
against the corresponding preferred values, which can be seen
in the middle picture. ese are the theoretical (static) responses
without consideration of neural noise. To add this neural noise,
each static response r staticj (ξ ) is replaced by the draw of a random
number from the Poisson distribution with parameter λ = r staticj (ξ ).
is can be seen in the right subgure. We additionally repeated
this sampling once, i.e. the blue and red dots in each case represent
a noisy population response and it is obvious that these population
responses dier not only from the theoretical reference but also
very much from each other. At this point, we see that the same
cognition (represented by ξ ) leads to dierent neural activities on
each pass, and that the estimation of a quantity (e.g. product rating)
or state of the world is thereby given a natural uncertainty.
Decoder Functions
What we have learned so far is the internal basic cognitive model
that allows dierent neuronal activity for a population of neurons
to encode one and the same state of the world. By means of sensory
perception, this model can be seen as the a translation of outside
reality into inside representation of the external world. By means
of cognition, however, this model provides the translation from a
cognition black box into internal and measurable representations
of thoughts and thinking paerns. e main question that arises
at this point is: How does the human brain translates population
activity into estimations for a state of the world or a cognition
respectively. eories assume the use of so-called decoder func-
tions. Mathematically, a decoder function is a mapping φ : Rn → S
from population activity onto the estimation scale for a stimulus or
cognition. is means that for a particular user-item-pair (u, i), we
can obtain an estimation of a single feedback submission directly
from the realisation of a population response, i.e. fu,i = φ(ϱ(ξ )).
Hence, noisy user feedback Fu,i can be represented as a random
variable given as
Fu,i = (φ ◦ R)(ξ ). (3)
In neuroscience literature, there are several decoders that have
been suggested and frequently used so far [22]. We will give a brief
arXive, April 2018, hps://arxiv.org
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Figure 3: Visualisation of decoder functions on a population
response for a given ξ = (100, 1, 1, 5, 3). e red and green
lines show the true and the decoded stimulus.
overview of the most frequently discussed decoder functions and
will relate them directly to the context of user feedback.
Mode Value Decoder. Due to the construction of tuning curves,
the MVD assumes that it is exactly the neuron with maximum
spiking frequency that is most likely to be addressed by the stimulus
or the state of the world. e decoder function is thus given as
φMVD : ϱ(ξ ) 7→ argmax
pj ∈S
{r1(ξ ), . . . , rn (ξ )}. (4)
Figure 3 depicts a population response for a 3-star-decision (red
line) together with possible estimators (green lines) for this decision.
is decoder is very prone to neural noise and its estimators are
subject to a great ambiguity which, however, diminishes for higher
frequencies in neural responses.
Weighted Average Decoder. e WAD accounts for all responses
by seing the specic frequency as a weight to the corresponding
preferred value and considers its contribution to the total response.
In mathematical terms, the WAD is given by
φWAD : ϱ(ξ ) 7→
∑n
j=1 r j (ξ ) · pj∑n
j=1 r j (ξ )
. (5)
As to see in Fig. 3, this decoder function does not produce ambigu-
ous estimators and is very stable against neural noise.
Maximum Likelihood Decoder. For a given population response,
the MLD chooses the estimator sˆ with a view to maximise the
corresponding likelihood function, i.e.
φMLD : ϱ(ξ ) 7→ argmax
s ∈S
P(ϱ(ξ )|s), (6)
where the likelihood itself is given by the i.i.d.-assumption together
with the Poisson probability mass function
P(ϱ(ξ )|s) = P(r1(ξ ), . . . , r1(ξ )|s)
=
n∏
j=1
fpj (s)r j (ξ )
r j (ξ )! exp
(
−fpj (s)
)
. (7)
In Fig. 3 we see the likelihood function (green curve) for the partic-
ular population response together with the MLE estimator (green
line). e MLD is the rst decoder that explicitly accounts for
neural noise through the Poisson probability mass function.
Maximum A Posteriori Decoder. e likelihood can be trans-
formed into a probability function over the stimulus via Bayes’
theorem, i.e. P(s |ϱ(ξ )) ∝ P(ϱ(ξ )|sˆ) · P(s). P(s) denotes prior belief
about the stimulus or the states of world that has been learned
through former experiences. e estimator is then chosen so that
this posterior is maximised, i.e.
φMAD : ϱ(ξ ) 7→ argmax
s ∈S
P(s |ϱ(ξ )) (8)
e MAD is much like the MLD but with less variability since the
prior works as a stabiliser. In the example of Fig. 3 we arbitrarily
used a Gaussian with µ = 3 and σ 2 = 0.75 as prior belief. e
Bayesian brain theory assumes a prominent role of this decoder
function, since each population would then naturally represent a
probability density over a stimulus or state of the world which can
easily be aggregated with other populations’ densities by mere addi-
tion. For multiple sensory inputs, this decoder function was proven
to be a plausible description for the brain’s operating principles [3].
eoretic Model Properties
As already mentioned, this modelling can explain the genesis of
uncertain user feedback Fu,i . For the purpose of exemplication,
we have computed the resulting feedback distributions for all in-
troduced decoder functions by using Eq. 3 for the cognition vector
ξ = (100, 1, 1, 5, 3). e results are depicted in Fig. 4.
Already here, certain properties of this model are clearly visible.
For the MVD, the vulnerability for neural noise is quite obvious
since the corresponding feedback distribution got the largest spread.
Even at the boundaries of 1 and 5 stars, there are still high probabil-
ities, hence this distribution is only slightly more informative than
a uniform distribution. Using the Bayesian denition of probabil-
ity (which is interpreted as ones personal condence), such a user
User Rating (Stars)
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
D
en
si
ty
Mode Value Decoder
User Rating (Stars)
0
2
4
6
8
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
D
en
si
ty
Weighted Average Decoder
1 2 3 4 5
User Rating (Stars)
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
D
en
si
ty
Maximum Likelihood Decoder
1 2 3 4 5
User Rating (Stars)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
D
en
si
ty
Maximum A-Posteriori Decoder
Figure 4: Feedback distributions obtained from dierent de-
coder functions for the cognition vector ξ = (100, 1, 1, 5, 3).
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Figure 5: Reliability Analysis – Comparing s (input) with possible estimations sˆ (output) by means of MSE/MSEmax in depen-
dency of the stimulus and tuning curve gain д. For the MAD, N(s, 0.75) was used as informative prior.
feedback would be provided by users who are not sure about which
rating seems appropriate. For the WAD, we notice the robustness
to neural noise and the quality of estimation. A user which would
utilise this decoder function would surely give constant ratings.
Conversely, users with larger uncertainties can probably not be
modelled by this decoder. e MLD reveals a remarkable property.
Due to the small size of the rating scale S = [1, 5], the likelihood’s
maximum frequently coincides with the scale boundaries. ere-
fore, this theory might explain the common user behaviour of
giving preference to these boundary ratings. At rst glance, the
MAD provides the most plausible feedback distributions which
seems to strengthen the Bayesian brain theory.
Of course, all of these distributions depend on the neural param-
eters in the cognition vector, i.e. the ability to decode responses
and compute estimators is strongly dependent on many factors. A
sensitivity analysis reveals that the strongest dependency is given
for the tuning curve gain, which is not surprising as the gain deter-
mines the frequency of neural responses and information is neurally
encoded by frequencies. A more thorough analysis of the decoding
quality is depicted in Fig. 5. By repeated cognition (population
response), computed estimators sˆ can be compared with the true
stimulus s by means of fractions of the maximum mean squared
error (MSE). In this case, the MSE has to be divided by its maximum,
because a change of s naturally changes the limits of the MSE which
biases analyses (e.g. for s = 3 the MSE can only be ≤ 4, but for
s = 1 the MSE can be up to 16). For all decoders, we see that the
estimation quality increases with neural frequency, i.e. the more
active the population, the beer a cognition can be translated into
a numerical estimate.
For the MVD, lower frequencies evoke that the middle of a scale
as well as its margins can be estimated slightly worse than the rest.
For higher frequencies, it is only the middle of a scale that can be
estimated slightly worse. is would inevitably lead to more uncer-
tainty for these values if a rating task is repeated. is decoder thus
explains the eect, that margin ratings are much more reliable. For
the WAD, we can see the opposite eect. is decoder is suitable
for users who give reliable ratings for the middle of a scale. Both
decoder functions need high frequencies (д ≥ 10) in order to work
with high quality. In contrast, the MAD and the MLD are capable
of forming the same quality prole with lower frequencies. is ba-
sically means a lower neural energy consumption for a brain while
maintaining full functionality (evolutionary advantages). Moreover,
since the MLD is only a special case of the MAD (with uniform
prior), the MAD is the only decoder function forming a variety of
quality proles, for which one would otherwise need two dierent
decoders. Evolutionarily, it is much more reasonable to develop a
single mechanism that can be used in all situations than to develop
dierent mechanisms for this task. ese arguments can therefore
be seen as another indication for the applicability of the Bayesian
brain paradigm. is also means that the MAD is again the best
candidate for a neuroscientic user model, which is in line with the
previous discussion of feedback distributions.
Neuroscientic User Model
e goal of this user model is to nd a specic cognition vector ξu,i
for each user-item-pair (u, i) along with a decoder function φ, so
that the model-based feedback Fˆu,i minimises the dierence to the
real user feedback Fu,i by means of an arbitrary disparity metric d .
Mathematically, our user model is given by Fu,i ≡ (ξu,i ,φ) with
(ξu,i ,φ) := argmin
(ξ ,φ)
d
(Fu,i , Fˆu,i )
= argmin
(ξ ,φ)
d
(Fu,i , (φ ◦ R)(ξu,i )) . (9)
In the case of ambiguity, that is, when several dierent cognition
vectors lead to the same minimum of d , we will select the vector
ξ = (n,д,w,o, s) that minimises the population energy
E ∝ n · (д + o). (10)
is reasoning arises from the fact that a human brain always has
to work in an energy-ecient manner and thus is most likely to
use the cognition vector, in which all n neurons spike as sparsely
as possible. e advantage of this model is that each user-item-pair
can be mapped into a high-dimensional space that theoretically
carries much more information than the consideration of product
ratings does alone.
4 EVALUATION AND RESULTS
Although it is clear that this model does not represent the absolute
truth about the human brain, the theory of nPPCs has oen been
conrmed in the context of sensory perception, and in our case
this model is (at least in theory) capable of explaining the lacking
reliability of user feedback in same situational contexts. In this
section, we will systematically evaluate this theoretic ability and
arXive, April 2018, hps://arxiv.org
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Figure 6: Visualisation of human uncertainty found in the
RETRAIN user study.
examine how far this model ts the real human uncertainty and
how adaptive systems may benet from it.
Measuring Human Uncertainty (User Study)
Im 2016, we conducted the RETRAIN (Reliability Trailer Rating)
study as an online experiment in which 67 participants had watched
theatrical trailers of popular movies and television shows and pro-
vided ratings in ve consecutive repetition trials. User ratings have
been recorded for ve of ten trailers so that the remaining ones act
as distractors, triggering the misinformation eect, i.e. memory is
becoming less accurate due to interference from post-event infor-
mation. e so obtained data set comprises N = 1 675 individual
ratings. As mentioned before, we discovered that user responses
scaered around a central tendency rather than being constant.
From all user ratings, only 35% manifested a consistent response
behaviour, while 50% gave two dierent responses on the same
item, and 15% used even three or more dierent ratings. A detailed
breakdown can be found in Fig. 6a. e human uncertainty itself is
thereby exponentially distributed as to see in Fig. 6b. In the follow-
ing, we use this data record1 to t individual feedback distributions
from all ratings that a user has given to the same item. ese will
then be compared with our model-based distributions.
User Modellingality
To assign each user-item-pair its own cognition vector and decoder,
we compute the model-based feedback Fˆu,i = (φ ◦ R)(ξ ) for each
of the four decoder functions φ and for each cognition vector ξ ∈
N ×G ×W ×O × S , where each set
N := {1, . . . , 250} G := {1, . . . , 100} W := {0.1, . . . , 2.0}
O := {1, . . . , 15} S := {1, . . . , 5}
contains 100 equidistantly distributed values. Altogether, there are
4 · 109 combinations to be examined brute force. Subsequently,
each Fˆu,i will be compared to the real user feedback Fu,i by means
of Eq 9. In doing so, we use two dierent metrics d , one for a
discrete evaluation (close to the original data) and another for a
continuous evaluation (more accurate, but on basis of assumptions):
Cohen’s Kappa: is metric is intended to evaluate inter-rater-
reliability and compares the concurrence of two independent
classications with the probability of reaching this agreement
1e data record is available open access at: link omied for review
by random guessing. is metric is given by the equation
κ = (p0 − pc )/(1 − pc ), where p0 is the relative agreement of
both raters and pc denotes the chance of a random agreement.
Its utilisation presupposes discrete nite classes which are
given by the discrete rating scale of the RETRAIN study.
To compute p0 for each cognition vector and decoder, we
draw ve model-based estimators φ(ϱ(ξ )) (rounded to an inte-
ger) and count the frequencies (nˆ1, . . . , nˆ5) where nˆj denotes
the frequency of all j-star-ratings. We only draw ve esti-
mators because the RETRAIN study has only ve re-ratings
and we would like to stay as close as possible to the real data.
To cope with the randomness that arises by considering only
ve draws, we just repeat this procedure a thousand times.
e so obtained frequency vectors can be compared to the
original (n1, . . . ,n5) from our study and p0 emerges as the rel-
ative frequency of matchings. For pc we basically follow the
same procedure as for p0, except that the ve estimators are
not drawn from the user model but from a uniform distribution.
Jensen–Shannon divergence: is metric is in line with the spirit
of the Bayesian brain paradigm since it assumes the user feed-
back to have a full probability density rather than considering
only ve values. Each user-item-pair is associated to a nor-
mal distribution obtained by ML-ing on the corresponding
re-ratings. For the model-based feedback, we compute 106
estimators φ(ϱ(ξ )) and also apply ML-ing. Hence, we yield
the probability distributions Pmodel and Preal for which we
compute the Jensen–Shannon-Divergence (JSD)
JSD(Pmodel |Preal) =
1
2DKL(Pmodel |M)
+
1
2DKL(Preal |M), (11)
where DKL(P1 |P2) = ∑i P1(i) log2(P1(i)/P2(i)) denotes the
Kullback-Leibler-Divergence andM = 12 (Pmodel +Preal). Since
we use the base 2 logarithm, the JSD yields the boundaries
0 ≤ JSD ≤ 2 log(2) or 0 ≤ JSD2 log(2) ≤ 1. (12)
e inequality on the right provides a normed metric to evalu-
ate the disparity of probability distributions.
For a perfect user model, one expects that only a single combina-
tion of cognition vector and decoder will make the disparity metric
d vanish and that all other combinations will maximized . erefore,
we will not only consider the metric scores themselves, but also
their ambiguity. e results show that each decoder function is able
to t constant users when using a suciently high frequency gain
or suciently small tuning curve widths. e average ambiguity
is 300, i.e. for about 300 cognition vectors we yield the same mini-
mal metric score. Nevertheless, with the lowest-energy-principle
from Eq. 10, we can select a single vector and represent users with
constant behaviour. However, it becomes clear that the strength
of our neuroscientic user models is clearly in the modelling of
human uncertainty. erefore, in the following analyses, we will
only consider those users who had provided unreliable feedback.
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Figure 8: Metric scores for the best tting cognition vectors
aggregated from all user-item-pairs.
For noisy users, the mean ambiguity is 5, i.e. only ve out of 109
cognition vectors lead to the same metric minimisation. In Fig. 8 we
can see the distribution of metric scores for best ing cognition
vectors. For the descriptive evaluation with Cohen’s Kappa, we see
that the MVD and WAD perform very poorly. Sometimes there are
user-item-pairs whose best t is 1−κ = 0.8 or even higher. e best
decoders are the MLD and the MAD. It is also noteworthy that there
are major overlaps when using this metric. is means that there
is ambiguity for the decoder function as well. For example, a large
proportion of scores for the MLD can also be achieved by the MVD.
Moreover, considering the whiskers of the MAD, half of the scores
can also be formed by the MLD. Nonetheless, rst rankings in model
quality can be anticipated. For the normed Jensen-Shannon diver-
gence, this ranking can be veried. In addition, we can notice the
increased amount of information when using distributions rather
than samples with ve draws. So, the scaering of metric scores
is much smaller. In summary, the maximum a posteriori decoder
can be mentioned as the best decoder function leading to feedback
distributions modelling reality with high quality. erefore, we will
conne ourselves to this decoder function for further elaborations.
Information Extraction
Finally, we discuss how adaptive systems benet from these new
information, provided by a high-dimensional neural space. In doing
so, we consider collaborative ltering (CF) in its simplest form:
User-item-pairs with corresponding product ratings are clustered
into user groups in order to recommend new products on the basis
of group popularity. In order to compute a reference for further
comparisons, we use a simple k-means approach to nd clusters
within the samples
Samplet = {(u, i, ratingt ) : u = 1, . . . , 67 , i = 1, . . . , 5} (13)
separately for each rating trial t = 1, . . . , 5. In each sample, we
randomly select 30% of the users in each cluster group to delete
their ratings for the hs item (testing-users). We use the mean
rating from the remaining 70% of users (learning-users) within each
group as the specic group predictor for item 5. is predictor is
then compared to the original prediction of the testing-users by
means of the RMSE. In this way, we get an RMSE score for each
rating trial, and if we repeat the randomised selection of testing-
users ve times, we get 25 scores that form a distribution. is
approach will be referred to as noiseless reference.
Since this approach does not consider any uncertainty informa-
tion, we need a second reference to ll this gap. For this purpose,
we primarily proceed like above. e only dierence is that we ex-
ecute clustering on the union ∪5t=1Samplet , i.e. we allow copies of
user-item-pairs but with dierent ratings. Our cluster groups will
therefore be much larger and means (predictions) more accurate.
Additionally, we do not compare the predictions with ratings of a
particular trial, but with the mean rating aggregated from all rating
trials. is stochastic approach will be referred to as noisy reference.
In contrast, we introduce the following methods, which are based
on the additional information of the nPPC user model:
ξ -Clustering: We associate ξu,i to each user-item-pair and use
k-means on the neural space {(u, i,n,д,w,o, s)}. We then pro-
ceed with selecting testing-users and learning-users, just as
for the references above. Due to the higher dimensional space,
user groups may be much more dierentiated and more appro-
priate for testing-user predictions.
Subspace-Clustering: Here, we associate ξu,i to each user-item-
pair and use k-means on the neural subspaces {(u, i,n)} (de-
noted as n-Clustering), {(u, i,д)} (д-Clustering), {(u, i,w)} (w-
Clustering), {(u, i,o)} (o-Clustering). We then proceed as above.
Noise-Proling: We associate ξu,i to each user-item-pair and
aggregate by users to yield sets Su :=
{
ξu,i : i = 1, . . . , 4
}
in
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Figure 7: Feedback distributions obtained from dierent decoder functions for the cognition vector ξ B = (100, 1, 1, 5, 3).
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which we consider only the rst four items. We simply calcu-
late the mean cognition vector ξ¯u,i = (n¯, д¯, w¯, o¯, s) for each Su ,
where s is le arbitrary. Subsequently, we chose s so that the
variance of the model-based feedback distribution (φ ◦R)(ξ¯u,i )
is as close as possible to the user’s average variance gathered
from the rating distributions of the remaining four items.
e results are depicted in Fig. 7. First of all, it has to be noted
that the variances of the RMSE distributions are relatively large,
which is due to the size of our data record. As a visualisation of the
RMSE’s oset (which emerges for uncertain user data), we addition-
ally calculated the magic barrier as proposed by [26] together with
its 95%-condence interval. We can see that the noisy reference op-
erates much beer than the noiseless reference. Moreover, we see
that the w-clustering and the o-clustering behave much worse than
both references. is can be explained by the fact that clustering
according to user ratings for predicting other ratings can be re-
garded as sensible since there is a causality. In contrast, the tuning
curve width as well as the oset are not causally related to the user
ratings. Actually, one would expect the same for the n-clustering
and g-clustering respectively. However, the n-clustering performs
a lile beer than the noiseless reference, although both distribu-
tions have a complete intersection. e results for the g-clustering
is quite surprising since it outperforms the noisy reference. We
explain this by a latent causal dependency between a particular rat-
ing and neural frequency. As previously mentioned, information is
primarily encoded in terms of frequencies within the human brain.
erefore, frequencies might encode ratings and uncertainty simul-
taneously. For the ξ -clustering as well as for the noise-proling
we can certify an excellent performance result. However, there are
some overlaps between all these distributions. For example, the
le whisker of the noisy reference reaches the third quartile of the
noise-proling approach. Hence, the noise-proling does perform
doubtlessly beer for only 75% of the data whereas the superiority
for the other 25% is associated with a certain doubt. Nevertheless,
the success of the neuroscientic user models against this stochastic
uncertainty model is quite clear, although one should also consider
that we have only investigated a very simple approach of collabo-
rative ltering. A focused investigation of more complicated and
more sophisticated techniques is therefore needed and will be done
in future research.
5 DISCUSSION
In this contribution we have broken with the view that user noise
or human uncertainty is something undesirable that only causes
trouble in the evaluation of adaptive systems. We explicitly permit-
ted this human property and developed a user model using noisy
probabilistic population codes (nPPCs) to reveal and exploit the in-
herent information. For this purpose, we formulated three research
questions at the beginning.
e rst question was about how a possible user model could
look like that takes into account human uncertainty. For this we
consider a population of neurons whose noisy tuning curves are
equidistantly allocated over an estimation scale (e.g. rating scale).
ese tuning curves can be adjusted by various parameters, which
we represent in a so-called cognition vector. By this preliminary
xing, the population provides an unreliable response to a stimulus
(e.g. a choice of a particular user rating), which can be converted
into a real answer through decoder functions. By means of two
disparity metrics we can nd a cognition vector together with a
decoder function for each user-item-pair so that measured feedback
distributions can be reproduced.
e second research question focused on possible solutions for
making the information available to adaptive systems. For this we
have chosen the example of collaborative ltering. e simplest and
most ecient method is the clustering of user groups based on the
neural parameters. ese represent a higher-dimensional vector
space than normally yielded by clustering for ratings only. e rst
results are very promising. We also revealed that the neuroscientic
user models outperform a mere statistical model for representing
uncertainty.
e third research question referred to the possible benets of
this novel paradigm in general. Every personalisation engine and
every recommender system has the goal of being able to map the
human being as accurately as possible. A knowledge of the na-
ture of man, together with his or her peculiarities, is hence crucial.
e theory of nPPCs is currently a much-debated theory and is
considered by many neuroscientists to be an adequate model of
human decision-making which is very close to real structures. e
Bayesian brain paradigm is always seen in a prominent role and
has been veried many times in neurological experiments. Such a
theory about human cognitions is hence a decisive possibility to
reach for the goal of adaptive systems and to map human beings
according to their very nature. But also an epistemological compo-
nent is delivered by this contribution. e nPPCs, which have so
far only been investigated for sensory perception, have been used
for investigating cognitions for the very rst time e performance
of these models on decision-making is thus a very good result for
theoretic neuroscience as well.
Future Research. In this article, we only examined bell-shaped
tuning curves. However, sigmoid-shaped tuning curves were also
frequently measured in vivo. Further investigations of these shapes
with respect to our user model are therefore absolutely necessary.
For example, initial results show that the population activity for
sigmoid-shaped tuning curves forms convex and concave functions,
which are the basis for the utility theory, i.e. the most widely
used theory for human decision making in the eld of economics.
However, the present model still needs to be extended by many
factors and correlates. For example, there might be dependencies
between the cognition vector and the evaluation duration, the
testimonial length, the revaluations of a given rating, but also the
weather, acute stress and emotional states are possible candidates
for biasing factors. Further research will also focus on accelerating
the classication approach as brute force is very slow and expensive.
For example, the runtime of the classication of 1 675 user-item-
pairs for the MAD was about 6 days using multi-processing on 400
CPUs with 2TB RAM of our university’s high performance cluster.
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